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How do trade liberalizations affect relative factor prices and to what extent do they cause factors to
reallocate across sectors? We first present a general framework that nests a wide range of models that
have been used to study the link between globalization and factor prices. Under some restrictions,
changes in the "factor content of trade" are sufficient statistics for the impact of trade on relative factor
prices. We then study the determination of the factor content of trade in a specific version of our general
framework featuring imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale, and heterogeneous producers.
We show how heterogeneous firms' decisions shape the factor content of trade, and, therefore, the
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How do trade liberalizations a⁄ect the skill premium, or relative factor prices more generally,
and to what extent do they cause factors to reallocate between sectors and across producers
within sectors? This paper o⁄ers a unifying perspective on the fundamental forces that shape
factor prices and factor allocation in a global economy.
In the ￿rst part of the paper we provide a set of su¢ cient statistics for the determination
of factor prices across a wide range of international trade models. To do so, we consider a
general framework that imposes only one key restriction: all e¢ ciency units of a given factor
employed in a country receive a common price. Given its generality, this framework nests the
traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model, which emphasizes di⁄erences in factor intensities across
sectors and factor endowments across countries.1 It also nests other models￿ emphasizing,
e.g., di⁄erences in skill intensities between exporters and non-exporters within sectors, di⁄er-
ences in the tradeability of skill-intensive and unskill-intensive goods, and complementarities
between skilled labor and traded goods such as capital2￿ that have been used to study the
link between international trade and the skill premium.3
We show that within this framework, each factor price can be expressed as the product
of two components. The ￿rst component is the inverse of the trade-adjusted factor supply,
which is the domestic supply of that factor less the factor content of trade (FCT); the FCT
is the quantity of that factor embodied in the country￿ s net exports. A decrease in the
trade-adjusted factor supply increases the factor￿ s price, just like a decrease in its domestic
supply. The second component is the factor payments for domestic absorption, which is
the counterfactual payments to that factor if domestic sectoral absorption were produced
domestically; this component depends on domestic sectoral expenditure shares and factor
shares in sectoral revenues. An increase in the average revenue share of a factor increases
the price of this factor. We use this decomposition to show how various mechanisms (which
have been proposed to link trade to factor price) operate through these two components.
Under some additional restrictions, the ratio of factor payments for domestic absorption
between any two factors is constant, so that changes in relative factor prices depend only on
trade-adjusted factor supplies. In any model satisfying these restrictions, changes in the FCT
1See e.g. Feenstra (2004) for a textbook presentation of this model and its implications for trade patterns
and factor prices
2See e.g. Yeaple (2005), Matsuyama (2007), and Burstein and Vogel (2010) for the ￿rst mechanism,
Epifani and Gancia (2006) for the second, and Burstein, Cravino, and Vogel (2010) and Parro (2010) for the
third.
3The restriction that all employed e¢ ciency units of a given factor receive a common price is relaxed in
the trade and search literature; see e.g. Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008) and Helpman, Itskhoki,
and Redding (2010).are su¢ cient statistics for the impact of trade on the relative price of any two factors if the
domestic supplies of those two factors are ￿xed: changes in the economic environment￿ such
as trade costs, foreign productivities, foreign factor supplies, foreign production functions,
domestic productivities, or domestic supplies of other factors￿ a⁄ect domestic relative factor
prices only through changes in the FCT. A similar result has been obtained previously by
Deardor⁄ and Staiger (1988) and Deardor⁄ (2000) in perfectly competitive environments
with constant returns to scale and common production technologies across producers within
sectors.4 We show that this result applies more generally in models with imperfect compe-
tition, increasing returns to scale, and heterogeneous producers.
While our general framework makes a clear link between the FCT and factor prices,
it takes the FCT as given. Hence, it does not provide insights into how changes in the
economic environment, such as changes in trade costs, a⁄ect the FCT and relative factor
prices. Moreover, while the FCT is a powerful su¢ cient statistic to assess the impact of
trade on factor prices across a range of models, measuring the FCT in the data requires
detailed information on factor employment and trade across highly disaggregated industries,
which may be unavailable in practice; see e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (2000).
The second part of the paper studies the determination of the FCT. To do so, we specialize
the general framework above to an environment with two-countries, two-factors (skilled and
unskilled labor), and two-sectors, as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model; with sectoral productivity
di⁄erences across countries, as in the Ricardian model; and with monopolistic competition
and heterogeneous ￿rms, as in Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007). In
this model, the ratio of factor payments for domestic absorption between any two factors
is constant, so that the FCT fully determines the relative price of skilled to unskilled labor
(the skill premium), as in our general framework. Moreover, the FCT also fully determines
the extent of between-sector factor reallocation and between-sector trade.
The FCT is shaped by comparative advantage, which is determined by cross-country
di⁄erences in factor endowments and sectoral productivities￿ as in the standard Heckscher-
Ohlin and Ricardian models, respectively. The strength of comparative advantage, however,
is also shaped by ￿rms￿decisions to enter and to operate in each market, which are absent
in these standard models. In particular, an increase in the mass of country 1 ￿rms that sell
in a given destination market in a given sector is equivalent￿ in terms of its impact on the
FCT, the skill premium, between-sector factor reallocation, and between-sector trade￿ to an
increase in country 1￿ s exogenous Ricardian productivity in that sector. The mass of ￿rms
selling to a given destination increases either because of an increase in the mass of entering
4Many empirical papers use this theoretical result to quantify the e⁄ects of trade on the skill premium;
see e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992) and Krugman (1995).
2￿rms or because of an increase in the fraction of entrants that operate in the destination.
Moreover, the extent to which changes in the mass of ￿rms selling in each destination a⁄ects
the FCT depends on the degree of productivity heterogeneity. We use this logic to obtain
the following results on the impact of trade liberalization on the FCT and, hence, on the
skill premium and the extent of between-sector factor reallocation and between-sector trade.
We ￿rst show that a reduction in trade costs induces countries to expand production and
exports in their comparative advantage sector and contract production elsewhere, as in the
Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian models. This between-sector reallocation lowers the trade-
adjusted supply of the factor used intensively in the comparative advantage sector (by raising
its FCT) and hence raises its relative price. This e⁄ect is often referred to as the Stolper-
Samuelson e⁄ect. We then study how the impact on the FCT￿ and, hence, the change in the
skill premium and the extent of between-sector trade and factor reallocation￿ of moving from
autarky to given aggregate trade shares is shaped by the extent of productivity heterogeneity
and by heterogeneous ￿rms￿decisions to enter and operate in each market.
Greater within-sector productivity heterogeneity weakens ex-ante comparative advan-
tage, reducing the magnitude of the change in the FCT￿ and, hence, the change in the
skill premium and the extent of between-sector trade and factor reallocation￿ for a given
change in trade shares. Given the extensive evidence of large productivity di⁄erences within
narrowly-de￿ned sectors, this comparative static exercise provides a rationale for empirical
results suggesting that the FCT is not very large for many countries like the US, and that
the extent of between-sector factor reallocation induced by trade and its impact on the skill
premium are small in practice; see e.g. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007). Endogenous entry and
endogenous selection of ￿rms into markets increases the magnitude of the change in the FCT
and, hence, the change in the skill premium and the extent of between-sector trade and factor
reallocation induced by a given change in trade shares. This result implies that measures of
sectoral productivity and endowment di⁄erences across countries would underestimate the
impact of trade liberalization on the skill premium and between-sector factor reallocation if
￿rm entry decisions are not take into account. Note however that, given our earlier results,
the extent of within-sector productivity heterogeneity, endogenous entry, and selection of
￿rms into markets have no e⁄ect whatsoever on changes in factor prices, between-sector
factor allocation, or between-sector trade, for given changes in the FCT.
Our results are related to recent papers in international trade identifying robust insights
for welfare analysis across di⁄erent models; see e.g., Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-
Clare (Forthcoming) and Atkeson and Burstein (2010). Whereas these papers focus on the
welfare implications of international trade, we focus on the distributional implications of
international trade. We show that across a wide range of workhorse models, the e⁄ects of
3international trade on the skill premium can be summarized by changes in the FCT.5
Our paper is most closely related to Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007), henceforth
BRS. Our contribution relative to BRS is as follows. First, we show that changes in the FCT
are su¢ cient statistics for the impact of international trade on the skill premium and between-
sector factor allocation. Second, we demonstrate analytically how the extent of within-sector
productivity heterogeneity, endogenous entry, and selection of ￿rms into markets each a⁄ects
the impact of trade on the skill premium, between-sector trade and factor reallocation.
Third, we revisit their ￿nding that di⁄erences in factor endowments induce what BRS call
"endogenous Ricardian productivity di⁄erences" at the industry level.6
2 Factor Prices: A Unifying Framework
In this section we present a general framework to examine the link between factor prices and
trade. The key assumption in this framework is that in each country, all e¢ ciency units of a
given factor of production receive a common wage or price. We ￿rst derive a simple expression
relating equilibrium factor prices to two components: trade-adjusted relative factor supplies
and the factor payments for domestic absorption. We then show how changes in relative
factor prices within a range of workhorse models of trade can be mapped into these two
components. Finally, we describe a set of assumptions that are standard in the literature
under which changes in the FCT are su¢ cient statistics for the impact of trade on relative
factor prices.
2.1 General Framework
There are N countries, indexed by n = 1;:::;N; J sectors, indexed by j = 1;:::;J; and K
factors of production, indexed by k = 1;:::;K. Let Lk;i ￿ 0 denote the stock of factor k
employed in country i. There is a common price, wk;i ￿ 0, for all units of factor k employed
in country i.7 We denote by Ei (j) ￿ 0 country i￿ s total expenditure on sector j, and by
5A large literature studies Vanek￿ s (1968) prediction that each country is a net exporter of the services of
its abundant factors, using the FCT; see e.g. Tre￿ er (1993 and 1995) and Davis and Weinstein (2001). Our
results are related to Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Tre￿ er and Zhu (2010), who show that Vanek￿ s
prediction holds across a wide range of models.
6Ho (2010) uses a similar framework to study the implications of idiosyncratic distortions on between-
sector factor allocation, the skill premium, and welfare, while Lu (2010) uses it to study how export market
participation decisions of Chinese ￿rms vary across sectors.
7One standard assumption under which each e¢ ciency unit of a factor receives a common price is that
factors are perfectly mobile across producers within a country. At this point we do not require an assumption
regarding the mobility of factors across countries nor do we need to distinguish between cases in which Lk;i
is in ￿xed supply or not.
4￿in (j) 2 [0;1] the share of country n￿ s total expenditure in sector j that is allocated to
goods from country i, with
P
i ￿in (j) = 1.
Factor payments: Let Lk;in (j) denote the quantity of factor k in country i, sector j that
is employed in supplying destination market n. At this point, Lk;in (j) is an accounting
variable describing how factor usage is distributed across destination markets. In Section
2.2 we discuss how Lk;in (j) can be constructed in a range of speci￿c models. The quantity










Denote by ￿in (j) 2 [0;1] the share of country i revenues from sales in country n in sector





















￿in (j)￿k;in (j)￿in (j)En (j). (2)
Equation (2) is purely an accounting relationship, stating that the payments to a factor must
equal the value of this factor used across all sectors in the production of goods bound for all
destination markets.
Factor content of trade: Denote by FCTk;i the factor content of trade for factor k in



















[￿in (j)￿k;in (j)￿in (j)En (j) ￿ ￿ii (j)￿k;ii (j)￿ni (j)Ei (j)]. (3)
We can understand this expression for the payments for the FCT, wk;iFCTk;i, as follows. The
￿rst term in the summation in equation (3), ￿in (j)￿in;k (j)￿in (j)En (j), simply represents
the payments to factor k embodied in country i￿ s exports to destination market n. The
second term in the summation, ￿ii (j)￿k;ii (j)￿ni (j)Ei (j), represents the counterfactual
payments to factor k in country i, had country i produced for itself the value of goods that
it imported from country n.
Note that constructing the FCT in the data requires input usage by destination country,
which may be di¢ cult to observe in practice. In Section 2.2, we discuss a range of models
in which the construction of FCTk;i is simpli￿ed signi￿cantly.
Factor prices: To show how FCTk;i is related to wk;i, we proceed as follows. By equation
(2), equation (3), and the identity ￿ii (j) = 1 ￿
P
n6=i ￿ni (j), we decompose payments to
factor k into two components:
wk;iLk;i = wk;iFCTk;i + ￿k;i. (4)
The ￿rst component is the payments for the FCT de￿ned in equation (3). The second compo-
nent is the factor payments for domestic absorption (FPD), ￿k;i =
P
j ￿ii (j)￿k;ii (j)Ei (j),
which is the counterfactual payments to the factor if domestic absorption were produced
domestically. By equation (4), factor k￿ s price is
wk;i = ￿k;i /Lk;i , (5)
where Lk;i = Lk;i ￿ FCTk;i denotes the trade-adjusted supply of factor k.
By comparing equations (2) and (5), it is apparent that for given values of ￿ii (j), ￿k;ii (j),
and Ei (j), the price paid to factor k in a trade equilibrium is equal to the price that would
have been paid to factor k in autarky had country i￿ s stock of factor k been Lk;i rather than
Lk;i. If a country is a net exporter of factor k, then its factor price is determined as if it has
a smaller stock of this factor. In this sense, we can think of Lk;i as the counterfactual stock
of factor k available in economy i in the presence of international trade.
Using equation (5), we express the price of factor k1 relative to factor k2 as
wk1;i=wk2;i = (Lk2;i /Lk1;i) ￿ (￿k1;i /￿k2;i). (6)
6Equation (6) decomposes the relative price of factor k1 to factor k2 into two terms: (i) the
trade-adjusted supply of k2 relative to k1 and (ii) the FPD of k1 relative to k2. An increase
in Lk2;i /Lk1;i, either through a decrease in the relative supply of factor k1 or an increase in
the FCT of k1, increases the relative price of k1. Similarly, an increase in ￿k1;i /￿k2;i, either
through an increase in expenditure shares in sector intensive in factor k1 or an increase in
the average revenue share of factor k1 across sectors, increases the relative price of k1.
We summarize these results in the following proposition, which provides an equation for
the change in the relative price of factor k1 to factor k2 between any two equilibria.






k;i denote the relative price of factor k1 to factor
k2, the trade-adjusted supply of factor k, and the factor payments for domestic absorption of





























Of course, both Lk;i and ￿k;i are endogenous, and their equilibrium determination￿ and
therefore, how they are a⁄ected by trade liberalization￿ is outside the scope of this account-
ing framework. In Section 3, we specialize our general framework to study the determination
of these variables.
2.2 Mapping Speci￿c Models into Framework
In this section we discuss how a variety of models of international trade, technological change,
and the skill premium can be mapped into the general framework above. We also describe a
range of model assumptions under which expression (7) and the calculation of the FCT can
be simpli￿ed signi￿cantly.
Heckscher-Ohlin-like perfectly competitive models: Here we focus on perfectly com-
petitive models with constant returns to scale in which all producers within a sector share
a common factor intensity that does not depend on the destination in which output is sold.
These assumptions are satis￿ed in the Heckscher-Ohlin model￿ see, e.g., Stolper and Samuel-
son (1941)￿ and its multi-sector and multi-factor extensions￿ see, e.g., Ethier (1984), Jones
and Scheinkman (1977), and Costinot and Vogel (2010). In these models, Lk;in (j) can be
constructed easily as the product of sector j￿ s employment of factor k, Lk;i (j), and the ratio
of country i sector j revenues earned in market n to total revenues earned in that sector,
￿in (j)En (j)=(
P
n0 ￿in0 (j)En0 (j)). Hence, the share of factor payments accruing to factor
k in sector j production￿ i.e. the factor k intensity of production in sector j￿ is the same






Moreover, with constant returns to scale and perfect competition, ￿rm pro￿ts are zero, so
￿in (j) = 1 for all i, n, and j.
In any setting in which ￿k;in (j) and ￿in (j) are common across destination markets, we








n6=i [￿in (j)En (j) ￿ ￿ni (j)Ei (j)]
P
n ￿in (j)En (j)
denotes the ratio of country i￿ s net exports in sector j to country i￿ s total revenue in sector
j. The variables Lk;i (j) and !i (j), and hence the factor k content of trade, can be measured
in principle using sectoral production and trade data.8
In this environment, the expression in Proposition 1 is simpli￿ed only because ￿k;in (j) =
￿k;i (j) and ￿in (j) = 1. However, we can further simplify this expression under a few
additional assumptions. If preferences and production functions are Cobb-Douglas and the


















In this special case of our general framework, relative factor prices change only due to
changes in trade-adjusted factor supplies. For ￿xed domestic supplies of factors k1 and k2,
any change in the economic environment￿ such as trade costs, foreign productivities, foreign
factor supplies, foreign production functions, domestic productivities, or domestic supplies
of factors other than k1 and k2￿ a⁄ects domestic relative factor prices only through changes
in the FCT.
Expression (10) was also obtained in Deardorf and Staiger (1988) and Deardor⁄(2000) in
a perfectly competitive environment with constant returns to scale and common productiv-
ities across producers within each sector. Our result allows for heterogeneous productivities
8If factor intensities vary across highly disaggregated industries, then constructing the FCT in practice
requires highly disaggregated data. See Feenstra and Hanson (2000) for an analysis of the bias in measuring
the FCT using aggregated industry data.
8within sectors, as in a multi-sector and multi-factor version of Eaton and Kortum (2002).9
Common factor intensities across sectors: A particular class of models nested by the
perfectly competitive, constant returns to scale models above are those in which factor in-
tensity is identical across producers, sectors, and destination markets, ￿k;in (j) = ￿k;i. These
assumptions are satis￿ed in, e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992), Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rul,
and Violante (2000), and Burstein, Cravino, and Vogel (2010). Under these assumptions,
equation (6) simpli￿es to
wk1;i=wk2;i = (Lk2;i /Lk1;i) ￿ (￿k1;i /￿k2;i)
Moreover, because FCTk;i equals ￿k;i=wk;i times country i￿ s net aggregate exports (i￿ s trade





























In this class of models, changes in relative factor prices across two points in time are driven
entirely by changes in relative factor supplies and by changes in relative factor intensities.
Changes in relative factor intensities can be driven by technological change (see e.g. Katz and
Murphy 1992),10 capital accumulation (see e.g. Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rul, and Violante
2000), and capital accumulation and international trade (see e.g. Burstein, Cravino, and
Vogel 2010).11
Factor intensity varies by destination market: In Matsuyama (2007) and Burstein
and Vogel (2010), markets are perfectly competitive, production is constant returns to scale,
and average factor intensities vary depending on destination market. In Matsuyama (2007)
producers are homogeneous within a sector, and trade costs are assumed to be skill intensive
relative to production. In Burstein and Vogel (2010), for a given producer, skill intensity is
independent of destination market, but the most productive producers tend to export and
to be more skill intensive. Hence in these models, ￿i (j) = 1 but ￿k;in (j) tends not to equal
￿k;ii (j) for n 6= i.
9An alternative assumption that simpli￿es equation (7) is that countries are symmetric. In this case,
trade is balanced sector-by-sector, so that !i (j) = 0 for all i and j, and FCTk;i = 0 for all k and i. Hence,
changes in relative factor prices only depend on changes in factor supplies and relative payments for domestic
absorption.
10While some paper treat technological change as exogenous, there is a large literature on endogenous
factor-biased technological change; see, e.g. Acemoglu (2002). The e⁄ect of such changes on relative factor
wages operate through changes in relative factor intensities (changes in ￿￿ s).
11Parro (2010) considers a model similar to Burstein, Cravino, and Vogel (2010) in which factor intensities
vary across sectors.
9With constant returns to scale it is straightforward to allocate aggregate sectoral factor
employment, Lk;i (j), to each destination market, Lk;in (j). Hence, these models ￿t into the
general framework presented above. However, equation (7) simpli￿es only because ￿ii (j) = 1.
In general, changes in trade costs will a⁄ect relative factor prices through both trade-adjusted
factor supplies and the factor payments for domestic absorption.
Heckscher-Ohlin-like imperfectly competitive models: In Section 3 we consider a
range of models featuring imperfect competition, heterogeneous ￿rms, and increasing returns
to scale, as in, e.g., Romalis (2004) and BRS (2007). With imperfect competition, ￿rms
may earn pro￿ts, so ￿in (j) is not generally equal to one. Moreover, in some cases it is
not straightforward to allocate sectoral employment, Lk;i (j), across destination markets,
Lk;in (j). This can be the case, for example, if a ￿rm must incur entry costs that do not
depend on the set of destination markets it supplies. However, we show that in the model of
Section 3, Proposition 1 holds with the FCT being constructed using equation (9), and that
equation (7) simpli￿es to equation (10).
It is straightforward to show that the same results hold in a two-factor version of Bernard,
Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), which is an extension of Eaton and Kortum (2002) with
Bertrand instead of perfect competition. Since there are constant returns to scale (and no
￿xed costs), allocating factors across destination markets is straightforward. With Frechet
distributed productivities and CES demand, ￿in (j) is constant and equal across destination
markets.12
3 The FCT in a Heterogeneous Firm Model
While the framework in Section 2 links the FCT to relative factor prices, it takes the FCT
as given. Hence, it does not provide insights into how changes in the economic environment
such as changes in trade costs a⁄ect the FCT, and therefore, relative factor prices. We now
focus on understanding the determination of the FCT. To do so, we specialize the general
framework above to an environment with two sectors, two factors (skilled and unskilled
labor), two countries, and monopolistic competition, in which heterogeneous ￿rms choose
whether or not to enter and which markets to supply.
We use this model to obtain three sets of results. First, in Section 3, we show that in this
environment, Proposition 1 holds, the FCT is given by equation (9), and the calculation of
12Epifani and Gancia (2008) consider an alternative model of international trade an monopolistic com-
petition. In their model, changes in relative factor wages are driven by changes in the FCT and sectoral
expenditures. Trade raises expenditures, Ei (j), in the skill-intensive sector relative to the unskill-intensive
sector in all countries, which tends to increase the skill premium in all countries, as is evident in equation
(6).
10the FCT in equation (7) simpli￿es to equation (10). Second, in Section 4, we demonstrate
that the FCT and factor endowments fully determine not only the relative price of skilled to
unskilled labor (the skill premium), but also the extent of between-sector factor reallocation
and between-sector trade. Finally, in Section 5, we show how the extent of productivity
heterogeneity between and within sectors, and heterogeneous ￿rms￿decisions to enter and
operate in each market shape the impact of trade liberalization on the FCT, and, therefore,
on factor allocation and the skill premium.
3.1 Model
Our model economy features two countries, i = 1;2; two factors, which we refer to as skilled
labor and unskilled labor; and two sectors, j = x;y, where x is skill intensive. While factors
are perfectly mobile across producers within a country, they are internationally immobile.
The exogenous and ￿xed endowments of skilled and unskilled labor in country i are denoted
by Ls;i and Lu;i, respectively. Each country produces a ￿nal non-tradeable good using out-
put of both sectors. Output in each sector is produced using a continuum of di⁄erentiated
intermediate goods, which are produced by ￿rms using skilled and unskilled labor. Interna-
tional trade of intermediate goods is subject to variable and ￿xed costs. Factors are perfectly
mobile across ￿rms and sectors but are immobile across countries.
Preferences: The representative consumer￿ s utility is de￿ned over a non-tradeable ￿nal
good, Qi, that (for expositional purposes) places equal weight on the output of each sector
Qi = Qi (x)
1=2 Qi (y)
1=2 ,




where Pi (j) is the price of sector j. Demand for the sector j good is Qi (j) =
Ei
2Pi(j), where
Ei = QiPi denotes total expenditure in country i.








Here, qi (!;j) denotes country i consumption of variety (!;j), and ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of













Intermediate good technologies: There are a continuum of ￿rms, each producing a
11unique variety (!;j). Firms face variable costs of production, ￿xed (market access) costs
of selling in each country, and iceberg costs of international trade. Both ￿xed and variable
costs use skilled and unskilled labor, where the factor intensity of production varies across
sectors but is constant across ￿rms within a sector and across ￿xed and variable costs within
a ￿rm.
A sector j ￿rm from country i with Hicks-neutral productivity z ￿ 1 that hires ls units





u units of output, where ￿s (j) + ￿u (j) = 1. Here, ￿k (j) denotes the share
of skilled (k = s) and unskilled (k = u) labor in production of all country i ￿rms in sector
j, where we omit the dependence of ￿k (j) on i since factor intensities are equal in both
countries. Because x is skill intensive, we have ￿s (x) > ￿s (y). Ai (j) > 0 denotes country
i￿ s exogenous total factor productivity in sector j.
To facilitate exposition in our results below, we decompose Ai (j) into two components￿
national TFP, Ti, and sectoral TFP, Ti (j)￿ so that Ai (j) = Ti ￿ Ti (j). We normalize
T1 = 1. We de￿ne a = A1 (x)A2 (y)=A1 (y)A2 (x) to be a measure of country 1￿ s relative
productivity advantage (if a > 1) or disadvantage (if a < 1) in sector x.
Firms from country i must ship ￿inq units of output in order for q units to arrive in
country n, with ￿ii = 1 and ￿in = ￿ni = ￿ ￿ 1. We refer to ￿ as the iceberg transportation
cost. Additionally, in order to supply a positive amount of goods to country n, a country i
￿rm incurs a ￿xed market access cost of fin ￿ 0 units of the sectoral composite input bundle
in country i; we assume that these ￿xed costs are produced using the same input bundle
as the production of intermediate goods in that sector. For simplicity, but without loss of
generality for our results, we assume that variable and ￿xed trade costs are common across
sectors. We denote by f = f12=f11 = f21=f22 the relative ￿xed costs of international versus
intra-national trade in all sectors and countries.
Under these assumptions on technology, a sector j ￿rm with productivity z from country
i incurs a cost





to supply q > 0 units of goods to country n. We refer to vi (j) as the cost of the sector j












and where country i￿ s wages for unskilled and skilled labor are ws;i and wu;i, respectively.
We denote by cin (z;j) = vi (j)￿in=z the marginal cost of a ￿rm with productivity z, sector
12j, in country i to supply a good to country n.
Conditional on a country i ￿rm paying the ￿xed cost to access market n, pro￿t maximiza-
tion implies that it charges a constant markup over its marginal cost, pin (z;j) =
￿
￿￿1cin (z;j).











and its market-speci￿c variable pro￿t is proportional to its revenue ￿in (z;j) = rin (z;j)=￿.
Selection of ￿rms into markets: A country i ￿rm chooses to supply market n if the
variable pro￿t it earns there covers its ￿xed market access cost, ￿in (z;j) ￿ vi (j)fin (j).
Denote by z￿
in (j) the productivity threshold at which the least productive sector j ￿rm from
country i sells in country n:
z
￿















In order to understand the implications of endogenous selection for trade patterns and
relative factor rewards, we consider speci￿cations in which endogenous selection into markets
is and is not active. In the speci￿cation in which endogenous selection is not active, we assume
that fin = 0 for all i;n 2 I, so that every entrant sells to each market: z￿
in (j) = 1 for all
i;n 2 I and j 2 J.13 We refer to this as the case "without selection." This case corresponds
to a multi-factor extension of Krugman (1980), as in Helpman and Krugman (1985) and in
Romalis (2004).
In the speci￿cation in which endogenous selection is active, we assume that fin is suf-
￿ciently large for all i;n 2 I and j 2 J such that there is selection into every market, i.e.
z￿
in (j) > 1 for al i;n 2 I and j 2 J. We refer to this as the case "with selection." This case
corresponds to a multi-factor extension of Melitz (2003)￿ as in BRS￿ or of Chaney (2008).
Note that the two cases we consider are not exhaustive. There are parameter values for
which there exist country-pairs and sectors such that z￿
in (j) = 1 and z￿
kl (j0) > 1.








It is this relative cost t that matters for our results throughout the paper, rather than ￿ and
13Under this speci￿cation, our results remain unchanged if market access costs are stricty greater than
zero and all ￿rms sell in all markets.
13f separately. We assume that relative costs of international trade are strictly greater than
those of intra-national trade, so that t > 1. Under this assumption, any ￿rm that exports
also sells domestically.
Entry: In order to understand the implications of endogenous entry for trade patterns and
relative factor prices, we consider two alternative speci￿cations on the determination of the
mass of entering ￿rms in each sector, Mi (j); we refer to these speci￿cations as exogenous
and endogenous entry. The di⁄erence between the two speci￿cations is the timing regarding
when entrepreneurs (potential entrants) realize their productivities.
In the speci￿cation with exogenous entry, we assume that entrepreneurs know their pro-
ductivities ex-ante. In this case, the mass of entrepreneurs is ￿xed at Mi (j), since if it were
unbounded then only the most productive would enter. Firms in each sector/country draw
their productivity z from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter ￿ and location para-
meter one: G(z) = Pr(Z ￿ z) = 1 ￿ z￿￿. This case corresponds to, e.g., Chaney (2008),
Arkolakis (Forthcoming), and Eaton et. al. (Forthcoming). For simplicity and without loss
of generality, we assume in the exogenous entry case that Mi (j) = Mi.14
In the speci￿cation with endogenous entry, we assume that entrepreneurs are identical
ex-ante. In this case, in each country/sector there is an unbounded mass of ex-ante identical
potential entrants. To enter, an entrepreneur incurs a ￿xed entry cost of fe > 0 units of the
sectoral composite input bundle (in the exogenous entry case, we assume that fe = 0 for all
j). That is, sector j startup costs in country i are fevi (j). Upon entry, ￿rms draw their
productivity z from the same distribution G(z) de￿ned above. This case corresponds to a
version of Melitz (2003) and BRS (2007) with Pareto distributed productivities. The free






[￿in (z;j) ￿ vi (j)fin]dG(z) ￿ vi (j)f
e with equality if Mi (j) > 0.
Finally, in all that follows we focus exclusively on cases with incomplete specialization; i.e.
in which Mi (j) > 0 for all i 2 I and j 2 J.
Trade balance: We assume trade balance in both countries. This implies that total expen-













[￿in (z;j) ￿ vi (j)fin]dG(z) ￿ vi (j)f
e
)
14This assumption implies that there are only two independent sources of comparative advantage: relative
endowments and sectoral productivities. Alternatively, we could combine di⁄erences in Mi (j) and Ai (j)
into a single parameter, e Ai (j). The parameter a in this case would be de￿ned using the e Ai (j)s.
143.2 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section we derive the equations that we use to solve for equilibrium factor prices and
trade patterns. We consider speci￿cations (i) with endogenous or exogenous entry and (ii)
with or without selection.
International trade: Denote by ￿in (j) the sector j expenditure share in country n on



























In the speci￿cation without selection, in which z￿












In the speci￿cation with selection, in which z￿





















We denote by ￿i = 1
2 [￿ni (x) + ￿ni (y)], for n 6= i, country i￿ s trade share. Note that ￿i
is the share of country i￿ s expenditure allocated to imports from country n 6= i. We also
denote by ￿i = ￿ni (y)￿￿ni (x), for n 6= i, the share of country i￿ s expenditure allocated to
imports in sector y minus the share of expenditures allocated to imports in sector x. The
greater in absolute value is ￿i, the greater is the di⁄erence between net imports in the x and
y sectors. Hence, for a given trade share ￿i, ￿i indicates the importance of between sector
trade relative to within sector trade.
Labor market clearing: In Appendix A we show that the labor market clearing conditions￿






















1 with endogenous entry
￿￿￿￿+1
￿￿ with exogenous entry and with selection
￿￿1
￿ with exogenous entry and without selection
(19)
in the di⁄erent speci￿cations of the model.
Equilibrium ￿rm entry: In Appendix A we show that with endogenous entry, the mass
of entering ￿rms in each sector is given by
Mi (j)vi (j)f









where e ￿ = 1=￿ without selection and e ￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)=(￿￿) with selection.
Solving for an equilibrium: Equilibrium factor prices, total expenditures Ei, expenditure
shares ￿in (j), and entrants Mi (j) can be solved for using factor market clearing as given
by equation (17) (note that, by Walras￿law, one equation is redundant), equation (18),
expenditure shares ￿in (j) as given by Equation (15) without selection and by Equation (16)
with selection, and the free-entry conditions (with endogenous entry) as given by Equation
(20).15
We compute production and consumption of the ￿nal non-tradeable good, Qi, as follows.
Given factor prices, nominal expenditures, and entry levels, the solution for sectoral price
indices is provided in Appendix B. Using sectoral price indices and the de￿nition of the
aggregate price level, Pi, above we obtain Qi. Our model and this solution procedure can be
extended to any number of factors, sectors, and countries.
In some comparative static exercises, in Section 5, we simplify the model solution by
assuming that countries and sectors are mirror symmetric: A1 (x) = A2 (y), A1 (y) = A2 (x),
Ls1 = Lu2, Lu1 = Ls2, and ￿x = 1 ￿ ￿y. Mirror symmetry makes the model more tractable
because ws1 = wu2, wu1 = ws2, and E1 = E2.
15After solving for an equilibrium assuming that the model is either with selection or without selection,
one must verify that all cuto⁄s are either greater than one or equal to one, respectively, using equation (13).
163.3 Mapping to General Framework
Since there is a common wage, wk;i, for factor k in country i, the model clearly ￿ts into the
general framework presented in Section 2. In the speci￿cation with exogenous entry, con-
structing Lk;in (j) is straightforward. It is the sum of factor k employment in variable pro-
duction and market access costs for supplying destination market n. With CES sectoral ag-
gregators, the share of variable costs in total sectoral revenue is constant. With CES sectoral
aggregators and Pareto-distributed productivity, the share of market access costs in total
sectoral revenue is also constant. Hence, with common ￿ and ￿ across sectors and countries,
￿in (j) = ￿ for all destination markets and in each sector, where ￿ = (￿￿ ￿ ￿ + 1)=(￿￿) with
selection and ￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)=￿ without selection. Since factor intensity is common across ￿xed
and variable costs as well as across source and destination markets, we have ￿k;in (j) = ￿k (j).
Hence, equation (2) from the general framework of Section 2 is simpli￿ed to equation (17)
in our specialized model.
In the speci￿cation with endogenous entry, constructing Lk;in (j) is more subtle because
there are multiple ways of allocating entry costs, fe, across destination markets. However,
for any construction of Lk;in (j) consistent with equilibrium sectoral factor allocation (i.e.,
Lk;i (j) =
P
n Lk;in (j)), we can again simplify equations (2) from the general framework of
Section 2 to equation (17) in our model. To obtain equation (17), we make use of two results:
(i) free entry implies that revenues are equal to total costs (including entry, market access,
and variable costs) in each sector, and (ii) ￿xed and variable costs have a common factor
intensity in each sector. Note that to obtain this result in the speci￿cation with endogenous
entry, we do not make use of Pareto distributed productivity or CES aggregators.
Given that factor market clearing conditions are given by equation (17), it follows that
we can express the FCT using equation (9) in all speci￿cations of our model. Finally,
with Cobb-Douglas preferences and production functions and unchanged share parameters
(￿k (j) = ￿0
k (j)), equation (7) from the general framework simpli￿es to equation (10), so

















Hence, in all speci￿cations of our model, changes in the skill premium are fully determined
by changes in trade-adjusted factor supplies. Moreover, since we impose that factor supplies
are ￿xed parameters (Lk;i = L0
k;i), changes in the FCT are su¢ cient statistics for the impact
of trade on the skill premium: changes in trade costs or in productivities a⁄ect the skill
premium only through changes in the FCT.
174 The Skill Premium, Factor Allocation, and Trade
We now investigate the impact of trade liberalizations on the skill premium, factor allocation,
and trade patterns in our model. We ￿rst show that if country 1 has a comparative advantage
in the skill intensive good, then the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill, Ls;i=Lu;i, falls in
country 1 and rises in country 2 when countries open to trade. We then show that changes
in Ls;i=Lu;i fully determine the impact of trade liberalization not only on the skill premium,
as shown in the previous section, but also on between-sector factor allocation and between-
sector trade. Through these results, we obtain a generalized version of what is often referred
to as the Stolper-Samuelson e⁄ect. The Stolper-Samuelson e⁄ect relates changes in factor
prices to exogenous changes in goods prices, whereas we relate changes in factor prices, factor
allocation, and trade patterns to changes in trade costs, via changes in trade shares.
We say that country 1 has a comparative advantage in sector x if the cost of the composite
input bundle in sector x relative to sector y is relatively lower in country 1 than in country
2 in autarky: v1 (x)=v1 (y) < v2 (x)=v2 (y) in autarky. According to this de￿nition, country







Condition CA follows from the de￿nition of vi (j) in equation (11), from the factor-market
clearing condition in equation (17), and from the observation that ￿12 (j) = ￿21 (j) = 0 in
autarky. Without loss of generality, we impose Condition CA throughout the remainder of
the paper.
To understand Condition CA, consider two special cases that are standard in the liter-
ature. First, if a = 1 so that there is no Ricardian comparative advantage, then country 1
has a comparative advantage in sector x if and only if H1=L1 > H2=L2, exactly as in the
Heckscher-Ohlin model. Second, if endowment ratios are the same across countries so that
there is no Heckscher-Ohlin-based comparative advantage, then country 1 has a comparative
advantage in sector x if and only if a > 1, exactly as in the Ricardian model.
The consequences of moving from autarky (￿1;￿2 = 0) to positive trade shares (￿0
1;￿0
2 >
0) on the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill in country 1 are stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 If ￿1;￿2 = 0 and ￿0
1;￿0
2 > 0, then L0
s;1=L0
u;1 < Ls;1=Lu;1 = Ls;1=Lu;1.
Country 1 is a net exporter in the sector in which it has a comparative advantage, sector
x: ￿1 = ￿21 (y) ￿ ￿21 (x) > 0 if ￿1 > 0. Because the x sector is skill intensive, country 1￿ s
18net exports embody a positive amount of skilled labor, FCTs;1 > 0, and a negative amount
of unskilled labor, FCTu;1 < 0, if ￿1 > 0. Hence, moving from autarky to any positive trade
shares reduces the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill in country 1.
For given trade shares ￿1 and ￿2, the level of the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill
in either country, Ls;i=Lu;i, determines important economic outcomes in both countries: the
skill premium ws;i=wu;i; between-sector factor allocation Lk;i (j); and between-sector trade
(the absolute value of ￿i). The following proposition states speci￿cally how these economic
outcomes vary across two equilibria with equal trade shares but di⁄erent trade-adjusted
factor supplies.
Proposition 3 In any two trade equilibria with equal trade shares ￿0
1 = ￿1 > 0 and ￿0
2 =
￿2 > 0, the following eight statements are equivalent:
(i) L0
s;1=L0









k;1 (x) > Lk;1 (x) for k = s;u (vi) L0
k;2 (x) < Lk;2 (x) for k = s;u
(vii) ￿0
1 > ￿1 (viii) ￿0
2 < ￿2
The intuition behind Proposition 3 can be understood as follows. A lower trade-adjusted
relative supply of skill in country 1 (statement i) increases the skill premium in country 1
(statement iii), as stated in Proposition 1. For ￿xed factor supplies, a lower trade-adjusted
relative supply of skill requires a higher absolute value of the FCT of skilled and unskilled
labor in country 1, which requires that the extent of between-sector trade be greater (state-
ment vii, since ￿1 > 0 from Condition CA). More between-sector trade requires that a
greater share of factors be allocated to country 1￿ s comparative advantage sector (statement
v). With trade balance and ￿xed trade shares, more between-sector trade in country 1 (state-
ment vii) requires more between-sector trade in country 2 (statement viii, since ￿2 < 0),
a greater share of factors allocated to country 2￿ s CA sector (statement vi), and a greater
absolute value of the FCT of skilled and unskilled, which is associated with both a higher
trade-adjusted relative supply of skill (statement ii) and a lower skill premium (statement
iv).
Combining Propositions 2 and 3, we establish the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Reducing trade costs so that countries move from autarky (￿1;￿2 = 0) to any
positive level of trade (￿0
1;￿0
2 > 0) raises the skill premium in country 1 and reduces it in
country 2, reallocates factors towards the x sector in country 1 and towards the y sector in
country 2, and generates positive net exports in the x sector in country 1 and in the y sector
in country 2.
19Intuitively, starting in autarky, a reduction in trade costs increases each country￿ s net
exports in its comparative advantage sector. This requires factors to reallocate towards that
sector, which increases the relative demand and, therefore, the relative price of the factor
that is used intensively in the comparative advantage sector.
5 Technology, Selection, and Entry
Changes in the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill are determined by changes in the FCT,
which are endogenous. Our next goal is to study how key margins in our model￿ the extent
of productivity heterogeneity between and within sectors, and heterogeneous ￿rms￿decisions
to enter and operate in each market￿ shape the impact of trade liberalization on the FCT,
and, therefore, on factor allocation and the skill premium.
These margins matter for equilibrium outcomes only through their impacts on expen-
diture shares ￿in (j). This follows from Proposition 3, which shows that for given factor
supplies and trade shares, changes in trade-adjusted relative factor supplies in each country
are fully determined by changes in the extent of between-sector trade ￿1, which is itself
determined by changes in ￿in (j).
Equation (14) illustrates the various exogenous and endogenous determinants of these
expenditure shares. First, composite input costs, vi (j), have a direct e⁄ect on expenditure
shares through the prices charged by active ￿rms. All else equal, lowering vi (j) increases
￿in (j) for all n. From equation (11), composite input costs can be decomposed into two
components: (i) factor prices and intensities, w
￿k(j)
k;i , as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model, and
(ii) exogenous sectoral technologies, Ai (j), as in the Ricardian model.
Second, the mass of operating ￿rms from each country shapes expenditure shares: an
increase in the mass of country i ￿rms operating in country n increases ￿in (j), holding all
else ￿xed. This mass of ￿rms can be decomposed into two components: (i) the mass of
entering ￿rms in country i, given by Mi (j), and (ii) the fraction of country i entrants that
operate in country n, which is negatively related to z￿
in (j). All else equal, an increase in
the mass of operating ￿rms, either through an increase in Mi (j) or a decrease in z￿
in (j), is
equivalent, in terms of expenditure shares, to an increase in sectoral productivity Ai (j).
Third, the extent of productivity heterogeneity a⁄ects the elasticity of expenditure shares
to a change in the productivity cuto⁄, z￿
in (j). In particular, a greater dispersion of productiv-
ity, a lower ￿, decreases the concentration of ￿rms around the cuto⁄. This implies a smaller
decrease in the mass of operating ￿rms for a given increase in the productivity cuto⁄.
In what follows, we study how each of these margins a⁄ects the impact of trade liberaliza-
tion on trade-adjusted relative supplies of skill, and therefore on the skill premium and the
20extent of both between-sector factor reallocation and trade. In order to isolate the e⁄ects of
these margins in our comparative static exercises, we choose trade costs, t, and relative coun-
try productivities, T1=T2, so that trade shares, ￿1 and ￿2, remain ￿xed.16 When comparing
across equilibria under di⁄erent parameter values, we always impose that factor supplies,
factor shares, and the elasticity of substitution between varieties within sectors remain ￿xed:
Lk;i = L0
k;i, ￿k (j) = ￿0
k (j), and ￿ = ￿0.
5.1 Productivity heterogeneity
Proposition 4 summarizes our ￿ndings about how productivity heterogeneity a⁄ects the
impact of trade liberalization on trade-adjusted relative supplies of skill, and therefore on
the skill premium and the extent of both between-sector factor reallocation and trade.17
Proposition 4 In the speci￿cation of the model with selection, the decline in the trade-
adjusted relative supply of skill in country 1, Ls;1=Lu;1, caused by moving from autarky to
trade shares ￿1;￿2 > 0 is greater the higher is a or the lower is ￿ if either (i) entry is
exogenous, or (ii) entry is endogenous and countries and sectors are mirror symmetric.
Consider ￿rst the intuition for Proposition 4 in the exogenous entry case. Increasing a
(i.e., increasing country 1￿ s relative productivity advantage in sector x) reduces country 1￿ s
cost in the x sector relative to its cost in the y sector, relative to that in country 2. These
changes in relative costs reinforce country 1￿ s comparative advantage in sector x, inducing
country 1 to specialize further in sector x. Hence, Ls;1=Lu;1 falls because the x sector is skill
intensive.18
Consider second the role of ￿ in the exogenous entry case. As discussed above, the
elasticity of ￿in (j) to a change in the cuto⁄ productivity z￿
in (j) is increasing in ￿. To
understand how this elasticity matters for economic outcomes, consider a change in vi (j), the
composite input cost in sector j. The direct e⁄ect of such a change on z￿
in (j) is independent
of ￿. However, a given change in z￿
in (j) has a larger e⁄ect on sectoral expenditures the less
dispersed are productivities, i.e., the higher is ￿. Hence, higher values of ￿ increase the
16If we were to hold trade costs rather than trade shares ￿xed, then some of our comparative static results
would be ambiguous. For example, an increase in technological dispersion, i.e. a reduction in ￿, would
increase total trade. This could o⁄set the direct e⁄ect of ￿ discussed in Proposition 4 below. Note also that
for given trade shares, the partial elasticity of trade ￿ ows with respect to variable trade costs does not fully
determine the implications of trade liberalization for the skill premium and factor allocation.
17Based on economic intuition and many numerical examples, we believe that in the case of endogenous
entry Propositions 4 and 6 continue to hold even if we do not impose mirror symmetry. However, we have
not yet been successful proving this more general result.
18Had we not imposed Mi (j) = Mi, then increasing the relative mass of entrants in a sector would have
identical implications as increasing the relative sectoral productivity in that sector.
21responsiveness of expenditure shares to a change in the cost of the composite input bundle.
This implies that factor endowment di⁄erences and sectoral productivity di⁄erences, which
a⁄ect the relative cost of the composite input bundle across countries, play a larger role in
shaping expenditure shares, and therefore trade-adjusted relative supplies of skill, when ￿ is
higher.
In the endogenous entry case, changes in a and ￿ have indirect e⁄ects on expenditure
shares through Mi (j), in addition to the direct e⁄ects we discuss above in the exogenous
entry case. An increase in a increases relative entry in the x sector in country 1 relative to
country 2, which reinforces the direct e⁄ect. That is, endogenous entry magni￿es exogenous
comparative advantage. To understand the impact of an increase in ￿ on entry, consider the
following thought experiment: Starting in autarky, consider a move to trade ￿rst holding
both z￿
in (j) and Mi (j) ￿xed. International trade increases market-speci￿c relative pro￿ts in
a country￿ s comparative advantage sector. Note that the impact on pro￿ts does not depend
directly on ￿ for a ￿xed z￿
in (j). Allowing now for changes in z￿
in (j) while still holding
entry ￿xed, the previous discussion implies that changes in z￿
in (j) are also independent of
￿. However, the less dispersed are productivities (i.e. the greater is ￿), the greater is the
change in a potential entrant￿ s expected market-speci￿c pro￿t given equal-sized changes in
z￿
in (j). Hence, given Mi (j), opening up to trade induces larger changes in the expected
value of ￿rms at entry, the higher is ￿. Hence, we should anticipate a rise in relative entry
in the comparative advantage sector, and this rise should be greater the higher is ￿. Thus,
the indirect e⁄ect of a change in ￿ on entry reinforces the direct e⁄ect of ￿.
While Proposition 4 focuses on the speci￿cation of the model with selection, we obtain
similar results in the speci￿cation without selection. In this speci￿cation, the parameter a has
the same e⁄ect as in Proposition 4. On the other hand, since the partial elasticity of expen-
diture shares with respect to composite input costs is 1￿￿ instead of (￿￿ + 1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿),
in this case Proposition 4 holds when ￿ is replaced by ￿. Without selection, within-sector
productivity heterogeneity does not matter for the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill.
5.2 Entry
Proposition 5 summarizes our ￿ndings about how the extent of endogenous entry a⁄ects the
impact of trade liberalization on trade-adjusted relative supplies of skill, and therefore on
the skill premium and the extent of both between-sector factor reallocation and trade.
Proposition 5 The decline in the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill in country 1, Ls;1=Lu;1,
caused by moving from autarky to trade shares ￿1;￿2 > 0 is greater in the speci￿cation with
endogenous entry than in the speci￿cation with exogenous entry.
22Because factor prices are relatively lower in a country￿ s comparative advantage sector,
entry is relatively greater there. Recall that a larger mass of entrants in a given sector is
equivalent￿ in terms of its implications for the skill premium and the extent of both between-
sector factor reallocation and trade￿ to an increase in that sector￿ s exogenous Ricardian
productivity. Hence, endogenous entry increases Ls;1=Lu;1, just as an increase in exogenous
Ricardian comparative advantage a.
5.3 Selection
Proposition 6 summarizes our ￿ndings about how the extent of selection a⁄ects the impact
of trade liberalization on trade-adjusted relative supplies of skill, and therefore on the skill
premium and the extent of both between-sector factor reallocation and trade.
Proposition 6 The decline in the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill in country 1, Ls;1=Lu;1,
caused by moving from autarky to trade shares ￿1;￿2 > 0, is greater in the speci￿cation with
selection than in the speci￿cation without selection if either (i) entry is exogenous, or (ii)
entry is endogenous and countries and sectors are mirror symmetric.
This result follows directly from the following two observations; hence, we omit a formal
proof of this proposition. First, trade patterns and factor prices obtained using the equa-
tions in the speci￿cation with selection limit to those obtained using the equations in the
speci￿cation without selection, as ￿ converges to ￿ ￿ 1, when all parameters are the same
across speci￿cations (obviously with the exception of market access costs, which are assumed
to be zero without selection). This is because, as ￿ converges to ￿￿1, almost all production
occurs within an arbitrarily small mass of very productive ￿rms. Hence, in this limiting
case Ls;1=Lu;1 is equivalent in the speci￿cation with selection and the speci￿cation without
selection. Second, in the speci￿cation with selection, the decline in Ls;1=Lu;1 (holding trade
shares ￿xed) is greater the higher is ￿, as shown in Proposition 4.
Intuitively, with endogenous selection the fraction of country 1 entrants, relative to coun-
try 2 entrants, that choose to sell in any given market is relatively larger in country 1￿ s











for all n. (21)
Recall that a larger fraction of ￿rms that supply a given market is equivalent￿ in terms of its
implications for the skill premium and the extent of both between-sector factor reallocation
19With endogenous entry, the relative mass of entrants also plays a role in this result.
23and trade￿ to a larger exogenous sectoral productivity. Hence, endogenous selection rein-
forces ex-ante comparative advantage. Note that when a = 1 this implies that the average
productivity of country 1 ￿rms supplying a given country is relatively lower in county 1￿ s
comparative advantage sector, relative to country 2.
Relation to BRS: Proposition 6 and Condition (21) are reminiscent of a result in BRS
that, with selection and endogenous entry, di⁄erences in endowments across countries lead











That is, endogenous selection implies that the average productivity of ￿rms that choose to
produce for the domestic market is relatively greater in country 1￿ s comparative advantage
sector, compared to country 2. This leads to their interpretation that di⁄erences in endow-
ments across countries induce what they call "endogenous Ricardian productivity di⁄erences"
at the industry level, which magnify Heckscher-Ohlin-based comparative advantage.
This interpretation may appear similar to our result in Proposition 6. However, BRS do
not show that selection magni￿es comparative advantage in the sense that it is equivalent￿ in
terms of its implications for the skill premium or for the extent of either between-sector factor
reallocation or trade￿ to an increase in exogenous Ricardian productivity in each country￿ s
comparative advantage sector.
Condition (21), which plays a central role in Proposition 6, di⁄ers from Condition (22)
in three respects. First, Condition (21) depends on a comparison of cuto⁄s in a common
destination market rather than in each country￿ s domestic market. Second, Condition (21)
emphasizes that a country is less selective in any given destination in its comparative advan-
tage sector, relative to the other country. Third, while Condition (21) is satis￿ed with either
endogenous or exogenous entry, Condition (22) is reversed in the speci￿cation with exoge-
nous entry. In particular, the following lemma shows that whether the average productivity
of domestic ￿rms is higher or lower in a country￿ s comparative advantage sector relative to
another country depends on whether entry is endogenous or exogenous.20
Lemma 1 Consider the speci￿cation of our model with selection and suppose that Ai (j) = 1
and, if entry exogenous, that Mi (j) = 1. If entry is endogenous and trade shares are positive,
then z￿
11 (x)=z￿
11 (y) > z￿
22 (x)=z￿
22 (y). If entry is exogenous and there is no factor price
equalization, then z￿
11 (x)=z￿
11 (y) < z￿
22 (x)=z￿
22 (y).
20In Lemma 1, we impose Mi (j) = 1 with exogenous entry and Ai (j) = 1 so that factor endowment
di⁄erences are the unique source of exogenous comparative advantage, as in BRS.
24Why does the relationship between the average productivity of domestic ￿rms across sec-
tors depend on whether entry is endogenous or exogenous? In our model, countries specialize
in their comparative advantage sector. Recall from equation (14) that an expansion of the
comparative advantage sector can occur along three margins: (i) ￿rms of equal productivity
can be larger, (ii) the productivity cuto⁄can be lower, and (iii) entry can be greater. With
exogenous entry, only margins (i) and (ii) are active. Equally productive ￿rms are larger in
the comparative advantage sector and, in order to have a larger mass of operating ￿rms, the
comparative advantage sector must be relatively less selective. With endogenous entry, all
three margins are active. Moreover, margins (ii) and (iii) are not independent. When entry
is endogenous, a relatively higher entry level in the comparative advantage sector makes
survival relatively more di¢ cult in the domestic market. Hence, this sector is larger while
also being more selective.21
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have provided a unifying framework to study how factor prices and factor
allocation respond to trade liberalizations. We derived a simple expression relating equilib-
rium factor prices to two components: trade-adjusted relative factor supplies and the relative
factor payments for domestic absorption. We showed how changes in relative factor prices
within a range of workhorse models of trade can be mapped into these two components
and described a set of standard assumptions under which changes in the FCT are su¢ cient
statistics for the impact of trade on relative factor prices. While these insights about the
distributional implications of international trade hold across a range of models, measuring
the su¢ cient statistics in practice can be di¢ cult. Hence, delving into the speci￿cs through
which international trade impact relative factor prices remains an important research avenue.
We then specialized the general framework to an environment that combines the key
elements of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the Ricardian model, and the Melitz model. Changes
in the FCT fully determine not only relative factor prices, but also the extent of between-
sector factor reallocation and between-sector trade. We used this model to examine how
the FCT is shaped by heterogenous ￿rms￿decisions to enter and to operate in each market.
Endogenous entry and endogenous selection of ￿rms into markets magnify the impact of
trade on the FCT and hence the change in the skill premium and the extent of between-
sector trade and factor reallocation, while greater within-sector productivity heterogeneity
21Another result in BRS￿ that the export cuto⁄ relative to the domestic cuto⁄ is relatively lower in each
country￿ s comparative advantage sector, e.g. z￿
12 (x)=z￿
11 (x) < z￿
12 (y)=z￿
11 (y)￿ holds both with endogenous
entry (as considered in BRS) and exogenous entry.
25weakens these e⁄ects. Given the extensive evidence of large productivity di⁄erences within
narrowly-de￿ned sectors, our prediction about the implications of within-sector productivity
heterogeneity provides a rationale for empirical results suggesting that the FCT, the extent
of between-sector factor reallocation induced by trade, and the impact of trade on the skill
premium are small in practice.
Appendix A: Additional Derivations
Labor Market Clearing with Exogenous Entry
Variable input costs: With Cobb-Douglas production functions, payments to skilled and un-
skilled labor hired as a variable input in the production of a variety of sector j in country i that





￿k (j)rin (z;j). (23)
Equation (23) implies that total payments to country i labor employed in variable production in





￿ ￿in (j)En, of which a share ￿k (j) is paid to factor k.
Market access input costs: Country i￿ s total market access ￿xed costs associated with selling
sector j goods in country n are given by
Fin (j) = Mi (j)finvi (j)z￿
in (j)
￿￿ .
Equation (12) implies that total sector j revenue in country i from goods shipped to country n is




























In the case with no selection Fin (j) = 0. In the case with selection
Fin (j) =





of which a share ￿k (j) is paid to factor k.
Total factor payments without selection: With no selection into any market, variable labor
costs represent a share (￿ ￿ 1)=￿ of total revenues and market access payments are zero. Therefore,





















In the exogenous entry case, Equation (25) and balanced trade imply En =
￿
￿￿1 (ws;nLs;n + wu;nLu;n).
Hence, equation (25) is equivalent to equation (17), where ￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)=￿.
Total factor payments with selection: Total payments to sector j labor in country i are the sum
























Equation (26) and balanced trade imply En =
￿￿
￿￿￿￿+1 (ws;nLs;n + wu;nLu;n). Hence, equation (26)
is equivalent to equation (17), where ￿ = (￿￿ ￿ ￿ + 1)=￿￿.
Labor Market Clearing and Entry with Endogenous Entry













Moreover, the share of factor payments that accrue to factor k is ￿k (j) in sector j,









By summing equation (27) across sectors, we obtain equation (17), where ￿ = 1.
Entry: Total entry costs in sector j are Mi (j)vi (j)fe. From the free entry condition, total entry














, and market access costs, Fin (j). Together with Fin (j) = 0, without selection,
and with equation (24), with selection, we obtain equation (20) both with and without selection.
Price Indices





























































Proof of Proposition 2. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose ￿21 (y) ￿ ￿21 (x). By equation




































n ￿1n (y)En P
n ￿1n (x)En
P
n ￿2n (x)En P
n ￿2n (y)En
.






where ￿ = 0 with exogenous entry and ￿ = 1 with endogenous entry. In autarky, Inequality (31) is
violated, since the left-hand-side is strictly greater than one under Condition CA and since ￿ = 1
simply because ￿ii (j) = 1 and ￿in (j) = 0 for all i 6= n. Note that for arbitrarily small trade shares,
Inequality (31) remains violated because ￿ and
v2(x)v1(y)
v2(y)v1(x) depend on trade costs only through the
￿in (j)￿ s, are continuous in the ￿in (j)￿ s, and for arbitrarily small trade shares ￿ii (j) and ￿in (j)
are arbitrarily close to their autarky values.
Since both the left- and right-hand sides of Inequality (31) are continuous in the ￿in (j)￿ s,
22Of course, if Mi (x) 6= Mi (y) in the case of exogenous entry, then we can always include the M￿ s into
the a term, as described in Section 3 and the proof remains unchanged.
28a necessary condition for Inequality (31) to be satis￿ed is that there exist trade costs such that
￿1;￿2 > 0 and Inequality (31) is satis￿ed with equality; i.e. ￿21 (y) = ￿21 (x). Equation (15)
or (16), and ￿21 (y) = ￿21 (x) imply ￿in (x) = ￿in (y) for all i;n. Hence, ￿21 (y) = ￿21 (x) implies
￿ = 1. Equation (17) and ￿21 (y) = ￿21 (x) also imply that
v2(x)v1(y)
v2(y)v1(x) equals its autarky value,
which by Condition CA is strictly greater than one. Hence, Inequality (31) can never be satis￿ed
with equality. By continuity, Inequality (31) can never be satis￿ed. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3. We decompose the proof of Proposition 3 into four parts. First, we
prove the equivalence of (i) and (iii). Second, we prove the equivalence of (iii) and (vii). Third, we
prove the equivalence of (iii) and (v). The proofs for the equivalence of (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii) are
identical, and therefore omitted. Fourth, we prove the equivalence of (vii) and (viii). Throughout
the proof, we impose L0
k;i = Lk;i, ￿0
k (j) = ￿k (j), ￿0
1;￿1 ￿ 0, ￿0
1 = ￿1, and ￿0
2 = ￿2.
Part I: (i) L0
s;1=L0
u;1 < Ls;1=Lu;1 if and only if (iii) w0
s;1=w0
u;1 > ws;1=wu;1.
Part I follows directly from equation (10).
Part II: (iii) w0
s;1=w0
u;1 > ws;1=wu;1 if and only if (vii) ￿0
1 > ￿1.
The proof of Part II proceeds in 3 steps.
Step 1: The following inequalities are equivalent (a) ￿0
11 (x) > ￿11 (x), (b) ￿0
11 (y) < ￿11 (y), (c)
￿0
12 (y) < ￿12 (y), (d) ￿0
12 (x) > ￿12 (x), and (e) ￿0
1 > ￿1.
￿1 = ￿0
1 and ￿2 = ￿0
2, together with the identities ￿12 (j) = 1 ￿ ￿22 (j) and ￿21 (j) =
1 ￿ ￿11 (j), directly imply that Inequalities (a) and (b) are equivalent, as are Inequalities (c) and
(d). In what follows, we ￿rst show that Inequality (a) is equivalent to Inequality (e) and we conclude
by showing that Inequality (c) is equivalent to Inequality (e).
We have ￿21 (x) = ￿1 ￿ 1
2￿1. Hence, ￿0
1 > ￿1 if and only if ￿0
21 (x) < ￿21 (x), since ￿0
1 = ￿1.
Moreover, ￿0
21 (x) < ￿21 (x) is equivalent to ￿0
11 (x) > ￿11 (x), since ￿
(0)
11 (x) = 1 ￿ ￿
(0)
21 (x). Thus,
Inequality (e) is equivalent to Inequality (a).
We conclude by showing that Inequality (c) is equivalent to Inequality (e). To show that
Inequality (e) implies Inequality (c), we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that ￿0
1 > ￿1 and
￿0
12 (y) ￿ ￿12 (y). ￿0
12 (y) ￿ ￿12 (y) is equivalent to ￿0
12 (x) ￿ ￿12 (x) while ￿0
1 > ￿1 is equivalent
to both ￿0
21 (y) > ￿21 (y) and ￿0
21 (x) < ￿21 (x). In the speci￿cation without or with selection,
equation (15) or (16), ￿0
12 (y) ￿ ￿12 (y) and ￿0
21 (y) > ￿21 (y) imply t < t0; while equation (15)
or (16), ￿0
12 (x) ￿ ￿12 (x), and ￿0
21 (x) < ￿21 (x) imply t > t0, a contradiction. Hence, in the
speci￿cations with and without selection, ￿0
1 > ￿1 implies Inequality (c). Finally, to show that
Inequality (c) implies Inequality (e), we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that ￿0
12 (y) < ￿12 (y)
and ￿0
1 ￿ ￿1. ￿0
12 (y) < ￿12 (y) implies ￿0
12 (x) > ￿12 (x) while ￿0
1 ￿ ￿1 implies both ￿0
21 (y) ￿
￿21 (y) and ￿0
21 (x) ￿ ￿21 (x). In the speci￿cation without selection (or with selection), equation
(15) (or equation (16)), ￿0
12 (y) < ￿12 (y) and ￿0
21 (y) ￿ ￿21 (y) imply t > t0; while equation (15)
(or equation (16)), ￿0
12 (x) > ￿12 (x), and ￿0
21 (x) ￿ ￿21 (x) imply t < t0, a contradiction. Hence,
Inequality (c) is equivalent to Inequality (e).
29Step 2: If ￿1 = ￿0
1 > 0 and ￿2 = ￿0




i for i = 1;2 is equivalent to
￿ni (x) + ￿ni (y) = ￿0
ni (x) + ￿0
ni (y), for i = 1;2 and n 6= i (32)





















in both the original equilibrium (without 0) and the new equilibrium (with 0). Equations (32) and
(33) yields E1=E2 = E0
1=E0
2.
Step 3: (iii) w0
s;1=w0
u;1 > ws;1=wu;1 if and only if (vii) ￿0
1 > ￿1.













n ￿u (j)￿1n (j)En
. (34)
With Lk;i = L0
k;i and ￿k (j) = ￿0
k (j), we have w0
s;1=w0
u;1 > ws;1=wu;1 if and only if














By Step 2, the previous inequality is equivalent to
￿11 (y)E1 + ￿12 (y)E2
￿0
11 (y)E1 + ￿0
12 (y)E2
>
￿11 (x)E1 + ￿12 (x)E2
￿0
11 (x)E1 + ￿0
12 (x)E2
. (35)
By Step 1, ￿0
1 > ￿1 is equivalent to Inequalities (a) ￿ (d). Inequalities (a) ￿ (d) imply equation
(35). Therefore ￿0
1 > ￿1 implies w0
s;1=w0
u;1 > ws;1=wu;1.
Now suppose that w0
s;1=w0
u;1 > ws;1=wu;1. This is equivalent to equation (35). To prove that
equation (35) implies ￿0
1 > ￿1, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that ￿0
1 ￿ ￿1. By Step 1,
this implies ￿0
11 (x) ￿ ￿11 (x), ￿0
11 (y) ￿ ￿11 (y), ￿0
12 (y) ￿ ￿12 (y), and ￿0
12 (x) ￿ ￿12 (x). These
four inequalities contradict equation (35). This concludes the proof of Step 3, and Part II follows
directly.
Part III: (iii) w0
s;1=w0
u;1 > ws;1=wu;1 if and only if (v) L0
k;1 (x) > Lk;1 (x) for k = s;u.
In the proof of Part III, we normalize E1 = E0
1 = 1. By Step 2 of the proof of Part II, we have
E0
2 = E2. Moreover, with E1 = E0
1, we have w0
s;1=w0
u;1 > ws;1=wu;1 if and only if
w0
u;1 < wu;1. (36)
The proof of Part III proceeds in two steps.
30Step 1: w0
s;1=w0
u;1 > ws;1=wu;1 implies L0
k;1 (x) > Lk;1 (x) for k = s;u.
From equation (17), we have










By Part II, w0
s;1=w0
u;1 > ws;1=wu;1 implies ￿0
1n (x) > ￿1n (x) for n = 1;2. By equation (37),
E0
n = En, and ￿0
1n (x) > ￿1n (x) for n = 1;2, we have
w0
u;1L0




















= wu;1Lu;1 (x). (38)
Equations (36) and (38) imply L0
u;1 (x) > Lu;1 (x). We similarly have
w0
s;1L0

























s;1 (y) < Ls;1 (y). Since Ls;1 (y)+Ls;1 (x) = Ls;1, we therefore have L0
s;1 (x) > Ls;1 (x).
Hence, w0
s;1=w0
u;1 > ws;1=wu;1 implies L0
k;1 (x) > Lk;1 (x) for k = s;u.
Step 2: L0
k;1 (x) > Lk;1 (x) for k = s;u implies w0
s;1=w0
u;1 > ws;1=wu;1.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that L0
k;1 (x) > Lk;1 (x) for k = s;u and w0
s;1=w0
u;1 ￿
ws;1=wu;1. By Part II, w0
s;1=w0
u;1 ￿ ws;1=wu;1 is equivalent to ￿0
1 ￿ ￿1, which, by Step 1 in the
proof of Part II, implies ￿0
1n (x) ￿ ￿1n (x) for n = 1;2. Therefore, w0
s;1=w0






















By equations (37) and (39), we have w0
u;1L0
u;1 (x) ￿ wu;1Lu;1 (x). By w0
s;1=w0
u;1 ￿ ws;1=wu;1 and
E0
1 = E1, we also have w0
u;1 ￿ wu;1, so that L0
u;1 (x) ￿ Lu;1 (x), a contradiction. Hence, L0
k;1 (x) >
Lk;1 (x) for k = s;u implies w0
s;1=w0
u;1 > ws;1=wu;1.
Part IV: (vii) ￿0
21 (y) ￿ ￿0
21 (x) > ￿21 (y) ￿ ￿21 (x) if and only if (viii) ￿0
12 (x) ￿ ￿0
12 (y) >
￿12 (x) ￿ ￿12 (y).
From Step 1 of Part II, we have ￿0
21 (y) ￿ ￿0
21 (x) > ￿21 (y) ￿ ￿21 (x) if and only if ￿0
12 (y) <
￿12 (y) and ￿0
12 (x) > ￿12 (x). These inequalities imply ￿0
12 (x) ￿ ￿0
12 (y) > ￿12 (x) ￿ ￿12 (y). The
proof that ￿0
12 (x) ￿ ￿0
12 (y) > ￿12 (x) ￿ ￿12 (y) implies ￿0
21 (y) ￿ ￿0
21 (x) > ￿21 (y) ￿ ￿21 (x) is
identical and omitted.
The proof of Proposition 3 follows directly from Parts I-IV and the similar, but omitted, proofs
that (ii), (iv), (vi), and (viii) are equivalent. QED.
31Proof of Proposition 4 Part 1. First, ￿1 ￿ ￿0











































Third, Proposition 3 and ￿1 ￿ ￿0







We now prove the comparative static result for ￿. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that
￿0 > ￿ and that ￿1 ￿ ￿0


































where the ￿rst weak inequality follows from Condition (40), a = a0, and (￿￿ ￿ ￿ + 1)=(￿ ￿ 1) > 0
while the second weak inequality follows from Conditions (42) and (43). Condition (44) and ￿0=￿ >
1 contradict Condition (41). Thus, if t and T1=T2 are chosen to match ￿xed values of ￿1;￿2 > 0,
and if ￿0 > ￿, ￿1;￿0
1 > 0, then ￿0
1 > ￿1. Combined with Proposition 3, this yields the desired
comparative static result for ￿.
We now prove the comparative static result for a. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that
a0 > a and that ￿1 ￿ ￿0



















which, contradicts Conditions (42) and (43). Thus, if t and T1=T2 are chosen to match ￿xed values
of ￿1;￿2 > 0, and if a0 > a, then ￿0
1 > ￿1. Combined with Proposition 3, this yields the desired
comparative static result for a. QED.
















￿ 0 , d
d￿￿ ￿ 0.
32With endogenous entry wu;nLu;n +ws;nLs;n = QnPn and with mirror-symmetry Q1P1 = Q2P2,
￿y = 1 ￿ ￿x, ￿12 (y) = 1 ￿ ￿11 (x), ￿11 (y) = 1 ￿ ￿12 (x), and ￿2 = 1
2 [￿12 (x) + 1 ￿ ￿11 (x)], in




f(2￿x ￿ 1)[2￿2 ￿ 1 + 2￿11 (x)] + 2(1 ￿ ￿x)g






￿ 0 if and only if d
d￿￿11 (x) ￿ 0. Di⁄erentiating
￿2 with respect to ￿ and setting d
d￿￿2 = 0 yields d
d￿￿12 (x) = d
d￿￿11 (x). Equation (16) implies
d
d￿
























d￿￿12 (x) = d





2 ￿ t2￿12 (x)
2
￿11 (x)










Equations (45) and (46) imply
d
d￿





2 ￿ t2￿12 (x)
2
￿11 (x)


























￿ 0 , d
d￿￿11 (x) ￿ 0 , d
d￿￿ ￿ 0.
Step 2. If d
d￿￿ > 0 then d
d￿t < 0.
Equation (46) and d
d￿￿ > 0 imply d
d￿t < 0 if and only if ￿11 (x) < t￿12 (x). Equation (16)
implies both (i) ￿11 (x) < t￿12 (x) is equivalent to ￿ < 1 and (ii) ￿12 (x) > ￿12 (y) is equivalent to
￿ < 1. Hence, ￿1 > 0￿ which implies ￿12 (x) > ￿12 (y)￿ implies ￿11 (x) < t￿12 (x), which itself
implies d
d￿t < 0.















33To obtain a contradiction, suppose that d
d￿￿ > 0. d
d￿￿ > 0 if and only if
(



































































Since t > 1, d
d￿￿ > 0 if and only if
￿


























< 0. Hence, d






￿￿1 < 0. The ￿rst term in Condition (47)





￿￿1 < 1, which follows from the
fact that ￿1 > 0 is equivalent to ￿ < 1, and ￿ < 1 implies v1 (x) < v1 (y). In the second term we
also have dt
d￿ < 0, which follows from Step 2. Hence, the second term in Condition (47) is positive.
This contradicts d
d￿￿ > 0. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof of Proposition 5 requires additional notation and two
preliminary steps. Let #1 =
￿11(x)￿2=￿1+￿12(x)
￿11(y)￿2=￿1+￿12(y) denote the ratio of country 1￿ s revenue in the x






i (y), where MT
i (j) and MA
i (j)
denote the mass of sector j entrants in country i in a trade equilibrium for a given #i and in the
autarky equilibrium (#A
i = 1), respectively.
Step 1. k1 is increasing in #1.
































































1 (1 ￿ ￿x￿y)
1 ￿ ￿2




















1 (1 ￿ ￿x￿y)
1 ￿ ￿2
y + #1 (1 ￿ ￿x￿y)
!￿x￿￿y
. (51)
Condition (51) and 0 ￿ ￿x ￿ ￿y ￿ 1 imply Condition (50), so that k1 is increasing in #1.
Step 2. If ￿0
1 = ￿1, ￿0
2 = ￿2, and ￿0
1 ￿ ￿1, then #0
1 = #1 (￿0
1) ￿ #1 (￿1) = #1.
Choose Q1P1 as the numeraire, which implies that Q2P2 is ￿xed given ￿xed trade shares and
that ￿1n (x)QnPn + ￿1n (y)QnPn is ￿xed. Hence, a su¢ cient condition under which #0
1 ￿ #1 is
￿0
1n (x) ￿ ￿1n (x) for n = 1;2. We have ￿0
11 (x) = 1￿￿0
1 + 1
2￿0
1 ￿ 1￿￿1 + 1
2￿1 = ￿11 (x), so that
it only remains to show that ￿0



























Moreover, ￿2 = ￿0
2 implies
(1 + ￿1t)

















To obtain a contradiction, suppose that ￿0
1t0 > ￿1t. Then Equation (52) implies ￿0
2t0 < ￿2t. Hence,
￿0
2=￿2 < ￿0


















35which is violated. Hence, ￿0
1t0 ￿ ￿1t, which is equivalent to ￿0
12 (x) ￿ ￿12 (x). Hence, ￿0
1 = ￿1,
￿0
2 = ￿2 and ￿0
1 ￿ ￿1 imply #0
1 ￿ #1.
We now use Steps 1 and 2 to conclude the proof of Proposition 5. Here we compare across two
speci￿cations, one in which entry is exogenous and one in which entry is endogenous, where the
endogenous entry case is denoted by 0. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that ￿1 ￿ ￿0
1 > 0,
￿1 = ￿0
1 > 0, and ￿2 = ￿0


























Moreover, Proposition 3 and ￿1 ￿ ￿0


































































2 (y) > MA0
1 (x)=MA0
1 (y) (56)
We know that MA
i (x)=MA
i (y) = vA
i (y)=vA
i (x), so that Condition (56) is equivalent to
vA0
2 (y)=vA0
2 (x) > vA0
1 (y)=vA0
1 (x),
which implies that country 2 has a comparative advantage in x and contradicts ￿0
1 > 0. Hence,
we must have ￿0
1 > ￿1 > 0. Proposition 3 then implies that the between e⁄ect is stronger with
endogenous entry. QED.
Proof of Lemma 1. The result in which entry is endogenous and trade shares are positive follow
from Part (a) or Proposition 4 in BRS, combined with the fact that domestic cuto⁄s are identical
across countries in autarky. The proof with exogenous entry follows.














36The price level equation￿ Equation (30)￿ and Equation (57) imply z￿
11 (x)=z￿
11 (y) < z￿
22 (x)=z￿
22 (y)




















































































Country 1￿ s comparative advantage in sector x implies v2 (x)=v1 (x) > v2 (y)=v1 (y) (without factor
price equalization). This implies that the left-hand side of Condition (59) is negative and that
the right-hand side of Condition (59) is positive. Therefore, Condition (59) is satis￿ed, which is
equivalent to z￿
11 (x)=z￿
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